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ABSTRACT
Over the last years network coordinate systems have
gained much attention as they allow for an elegant esti-
mation of distances between peer-to-peer endsystems.
The most prominent representative of these approaches
is Vivaldi, which is using a mass-spring-damper sys-
tem to embed peers into a two-dimensional Euclidean
coordinate space with an additional height coordinate
to model access delays to the core network. In unim-
paired overlay networks this simple method leads to a
good approximation of pairwise delays.
Unfortunately, like most distributed algorithms, Vivaldi
is likely to suffer from byzantine failures and several
attack methods and countermeasures have been pro-
posed. In this article we analyze theoretic bounds for a
protection of Vivaldi network coordinates and show in
particular how violations of the triangle inequality can
in theory and simulation be exploited to create arbitrary
movements.
Index Terms— Security, Peer-to-Peer, Network Coor-
dinates, Vivaldi
1. INTRODUCTION
Distributed algorithms in the form of peer-to-peer over-
lay networks have gained much attention over the last
years [1, 2, 3]. One of the often addressed problems
is the optimization of overlay routing algorithms to un-
derlay network topologies. In a simple case the dis-
tance within the overlay is not only minimized in each
step, instead a greedy forward is performed by choos-
ing the smallest quotient of overlay and underlay dis-
tance.
More complex systems adapt their overlay topologies
to given underlay constraints. For example, some ap-
plication layer multicast (ALM) systems create data
distribution trees that are location aware [4]. The au-
thors of RON [5] proposed an overlay network that ex-
ploits violations of the triangle inequality of the delay
between its nodes. Thus, if it is quicker to forward data
to an overlay node via a different overlay node than
over a direct communication path the proxy is used. In
order to determine the delays RON uses periodic pair-
wise measurements of the corresponding round-trip-
times. The problem of this approach is its bad scalabil-
ity as the number of transmitted packet grows quadrat-
ically to the number of overlay hosts.
To address this issue [6] proposed a decentralized ap-
proach to establish network coordinate systems. Sub-
sequently, with the presentation of Vivaldi [7], a fully
distributed algorithm became available to calculate arti-
ﬁcial coordinates on basis of a spring-mass-model. As
sketched in Fig. 1, a peculiarity of Vivaldi is the uti-
lization of both a Euclidean and a Manhattan distance
to model the access delay to the core network with a
height coordinate, which reminds of an upside-down
brush. After multiple rounds of calculations, the algo-
rithm usually stabilizes, and the distances between co-
ordinates indicate the actual delay between peers. Peer-
to-peer mechanisms can use the coordinates to estimate
the gain of topology changes before actually perform-
ing them. In particular it is possible for a node to fore-
cast the round-trip-times between two other nodes.
Fig. 1. Network coordinate space in Vivaldi: combi-
nation of Euclidean and Manhattan distance forming a
brush
Unfortunately, Vivaldi has other drawbacks, which is
most particularly its security. Without further protec-
tion mechanisms, a malicious node can claim arbitrary
positions and delay probes. Kaafar et al. [8] have
shown in various simulations, that by performing these
attacks not only the own coordinates are inﬂuenced,
but due to the spring-mass-model neighboring nodes
are affected, too. Hence, it was only a consequence,
that different countermeasures and counterattacks have
been developed.
However, as none of the countermeasures has been
successful for all attack models, the question arises
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whether comprehensive protection is possible at all.
Thus, in this article we will perform the following
contributions:
• the current state of research in Vivaldi protection
is given,
• a mechanism to limit the inﬂuence of artiﬁcial
delays is presented,
• several best practices towards a secure Vivaldi
operation are derived, color=blue!30]Eigentlich
machen wir es doch nur kaputt...
• and we perform a theoretical analysis of Vi-
valdi’s interaction with the application layer,
leading to a novel, potential security issue, which
cannot be coped with under the assumption of a
generic application overlay.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: First a
background on the Vivaldi algorithm is provided, fol-
lowed by an attacker model in section 3, which has to
be considered by protection mechanisms. A state of
the art analysis on the protection of network coordinate
systems is presented in section 4. The main analysis of
upper bounds for protection mechanisms is performed
in section 5, followed by a short evaluation. The ar-
ticle closes with a conclusion and some directions for
further work.
2. BACKGROUND
As the estimation of pairwise delays between the net-
work hosts gained attention, virtual network coordinate
systems moved into the focus. These systems basically
map the nodes into a multidimensional coordinate
space, where coordinates are calculated with respect to
probed delays between the corresponding nodes. At
the end of the computation, the distance between the
coordinates of two nodes give an estimation of their
network delay. A naive way to generate a coordinate
approximation is to measure all pairwise delays ﬁrst,
move them to a designated node, and use a central
optimization algorithm. This method obviously suffers
from a poor scalability, much communication over-
head, and a single point of failure. Hence, a system
is needed that provides results of similar quality, but
requires fewer samples and no central coordinator.
Many methods have been proposed to address
this problem: Systems like Global Network
Positioning (GNP) [6] or Practical Internet Coor-
dinates for Distance Estimation (PIC) [9] are using
ﬁxed nodes with predeﬁned coordinates called land-
marks. Thus new nodes are able to compute their own
coordinates based on measurements to a few landmark
nodes. While these methods provide good results,
they require designated nodes, whose compromise or
failure may have dramatic effects on the whole system.
As a result Dabek et al. proposed the fully distributed
Vivaldi algorithm [7] that uses a method inspired by
a mass-spring-damper system. Connections between
nodes are illustrated to be springs, where the length
of each spring is equivalent to the delay between the
attached nodes. After a random initialization of the
coordinates, the occurring forces move nodes until a
stable position is reached. If the coordinate’s distance
of two nodes is smaller than length represented by the
measured delay, the virtual spring is compressed, thus
evokes a force pushing the nodes apart. Nodes that
have too distant coordinates are pulled together in the
same way. Using the physical model it is possible to
show that all nodes coordinates converge to ﬁxed points
in ﬁnite time.
In order to use this principle for coordinate com-
putation in a distributed fashion some further
simpliﬁcations and modiﬁcations are necessary. To
limit the communication and coordination overhead
each Vivaldi node is only connected to a ﬁxed number
of neighbors, which are periodically asked for their
coordinates and an error approximation. During the
periodic polling the round-trip-times are measured and
used to calculate a new iteration of algorithm 1. Its
Algorithm 1 Decentralized Vivaldi using a dynamic
damping factor
Require: Measured delay rtt, nodes coordinate ai
peer coordinate aj , estimated nodes coordinate er-
ror ei, estimated peer coordinate error ej , constant
parameters ce, cc
w = eiei+ej # Error balance
e = rtt− ||ai − aj || # Absolute estimation error
u =
ai−aj
||ai−aj || # Direction of the movement
ei =
|e|
rttcew + ei(1− cew) # New error estimation
δ = ccw # Dynamic damping factor
ai = ai + δe× u # Coordinate update
basic idea is to calculate the estimation error e and
move the nodes coordinate a tiny step towards the
peers coordinate or away from it respectively. The
absolute change in the coordinate is determined by the
absolute error e and the damping factor δ which itself
depends on the error estimations ei and ej . Each node
maintains such an error estimation that expresses its
conﬁdence in its own coordinate.
A variety of metrics can be used to embed the nodes
into the virtual coordinate space. Dabek et al. [7]
experimented with multidimensional Euclidean spaces,
spherical coordinates, and their own development, a 2-
dimensional Euclidean metric mixed with the manhat-
tan distance, reminding of an upside-down brush and
therefore called brush space in the following. Using the
brush space, each node is mapped into a 2-dimensional
space, that is augmented with a height as shown in
Fig. 1. The distance between two neighboring nodes
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a = (a1, a2, ah) and b = (b1, b2, bh) is then computed
as |b − a| = √(b1 − a1)2 + (b2 − a2)2 + ah + bh.
As this metric allows an embedding of typical internet
nodes with a low average error it is considered to be
most suitable for Vivaldi.
3. ATTACKER MODEL & SECURITY
OBJECTIVES
Overlay nodes executing Vivaldi can in theory be
attacked by external as well as internal offenders,
whereas a protection against externals can be achieved
by utilizing encryption mechanisms like Datagram
Transport Layer Security (DTLS) in combination with
ﬁlters against delay attacks. More complicated is the
possible inﬂuence of internal attackers, which may be
able to inﬂuence:
• the coordinates that are reported to other nodes,
• the remote error value,
• round-trip-times measured by other nodes to the
offender,
• and the overlay links chosen for measurement.
As internal attackers are realistic for most overlay net-
works and more powerful, we focus on them in this
article.
Under these harsh conditions a perfect network coordi-
nate system should give the following guarantees:
• Convergence: The network coordinates should
tend to reﬂect the actual delays between hosts,
and the calculated node distances should not
change in a stable environment.
• Immunity to selective moving: Even with a
low number of internal attackers, it should not
be possible for them to move an arbitrary node
too much in a certain direction.
• Immunity to byzantine coordinates: Attack-
ers should not be able to lie themselves to self-
chosen coordinates, e.g., in order to attract over-
lay trafﬁc.
Depending on the upper layer application, and the type
and number of attackers in the overlay network, these
goals can only be achieved to a certain degree.
4. RELATED WORK
Although the Vivaldi algorithm provides a good esti-
mation of the inter-node delays, it contains no protec-
tion against malicious nodes which delay their replies
or even send arbitrary coordinates instead of their own.
Kaafar et al. [10] developed several attacks based on
these two methods that dramatically decrease the ac-
curacy of the Vivaldi coordinates. As a result many
mechanisms have been proposed to prevent malicious
behavior or at least detect it:
Statistical Filters: Zage et al. [11] proposed an out-
lier detection mechanism that is based on temporal and
spacial observations of the neighboring nodes behav-
ior. In the embedding process a nodes coordinate is
assumed to converge, thus causing the local error and
the coordinates movement to drop. This characteris-
tic is used by the temporal outlier detection to iden-
tify nodes, that "jump" through the coordinate space.
The spacial detection is based on the assumption that a
dependency exists between the coordinate’s movement
of the neighbors. Nodes, whose local error movement
differs signiﬁcant from the behavior of the other nodes
are considered malicious and not used for the Vivaldi-
algorithm. This method also prevents well embedded
nodes from reducing their accuracy by communicating
with newly joined nodes. Both mechanisms in combi-
nation can be used to reduce the set of capabilities an
attacker has to reduce the systems accuracy, since his
actions must not cause an exceedance of the preconﬁg-
ured thresholds.
Kaafar et al. [12] consider the use of a Kalman ﬁlter
[13] to achieve the same goal. Trusted observer nodes
are set up whose neighbors are only other observers,
thus these nodes can calibrate the ﬁlter’s parameters so
that the ﬁlter can predict the nodes movement through
the coordinate space. Every normal node has to contact
a close observer to obtain its parameters and run a ﬁlter
by itself. If the update caused changes in the coordinate
would differ too much from the predicted movement
the update is rejected.
Both mechanisms can be used to reduce the attacker’s
space of action, however they are useless if applied
alone, since Chan-Tin et al. proposed a counter attack
[14].
Veracity: The basic idea behind Veracity [15] is to as-
sign a set of veriﬁcation nodes to each node that check
the node’s coordinates. After a node (the initiator) re-
ceives a reply from a neighbor (the suspect) it contacts
the suspect’s veriﬁcation nodes to retrieve their vote.
Each veriﬁcation node compares the measured delay
towards the suspect with the estimated distance deter-
mined by the Vivaldi-system. If the approximation er-
ror exceeds a threshold the veriﬁcation node casts a
negative vote. After the initiator collected all votes it
follows the majority’s decision and discards the sus-
pects coordinate or passes it to the Vivaldi-algorithm.
While this method is a promising approach, it suffers
from some practical issues such as bootstrapping and
delay attacks against the veriﬁcation nodes.
By now, no mechanism has been proposed that secures
Vivaldi entirely and the question arises, if that is even
possible. Hence, theoretical bounds for attack counter-
measures are presented in the following section, that
will reveal some of Vivaldi’s inherent security prob-
lems.
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5. THEORETICAL BOUNDS FOR ATTACK
COUNTERMEASURES
Despite the outlined powerful internal attacker, in the
following the overlay network is assumed to be pro-
tected by a hypothetical mechanism that perfectly pre-
vents byzantine attacks as it is our intention to explore
the theoretical bounds of countermeasures against Vi-
valdi attacks. In particular even each hostile node is
only assumed to be able to choose the nodes it connects
to, and it may delay packets for an arbitrary, though rea-
sonable time. Due to the protection mechanism, attack-
ers cannot lie about their own coordinates, estimated
errors, and cannot answer quicker than their real delay.
5.1. Estimating upper bounds for delays
In order to further improve Vivaldi’s resistance against
delay attacks we propose a novel heuristic, based on
traceroutes and the assumption that an attacker cannot
compromise the core network. As the height of a Vi-
valdi coordinate models the access delay to a core net-
work, every overlay host is assumed to initialize its own
height with the delay to its ﬁrst Internet router. And
even though the height may ﬂuctuate a little over time,
it should always reﬂect the delay to a core router.
Exploiting this situation, a host may verify the position
of another by performing a traceroute and ﬁnding the
last core router of the path. To protect against mali-
cious traceroutes answers, the following mechanisms
are deployed:
1. Nonces in probe packets are used to prevent too
early answers by attackers, possibly spooﬁng the
address of a core router.
2. By querying databases, such as RIPE, it is veri-
ﬁed that the last router belonging to the a differ-
ent organization will be referenced.
3. Instead of utilizing the traceroute itself to mea-
sure delays, additional Internet Control Message
Protocol (ICMP) echo requests are used to mea-
sure the delay to the last core router as well as
the corresponding overlay node. This is because
some router ﬁrmwares were found to delay an-
swers to traceroutes, and thus caused anomalies.
4. Last-hop Routers and overlay nodes that discard
tracesroutes are excluded from measurements
and not used for reference.
5. Finally, in order to verify that a potential attacker
did not add artiﬁcial peers to the path, an addi-
tional traceroute is performed targeted at the core
router (see Fig. 2). If the intermediate nodes do
not match, the overlay node either added peers,
or (in rare cases) policy routing chose another
path. In either situation the measurement is dis-
carded.
☠
1.
2.
Fig. 2. Discovery of maliciously extended path by a
second traceroute to last claimed core router
The obtained delay information is then used to check
if height ≈ dnode − drouter holds, and if not the ad-
justment is discarded. Thus, when performing delay
attacks the height must also be adjusted in order to gen-
erate valid updates. However, this will only cause the
attacker to move into a maverick position. All in all,
the heuristic allows for a feasibility check of reported
delays up to a quality that solely depends on the al-
lowed violation of the height model. It is expected that
violations can be bound to 20ms for real life overlay
networks, such the Planetlab.
5.2. Using asymmetric links
In contrast to a real life spring-mass-model, the authors
of Vivaldi did not specify that the neighborhood rela-
tion must be symmetric. Thus, if a node queries another
node for a position update and latency measurement,
the other node does not have to take the quering node
into account. From a security perspective this asymme-
try is a desired property as it prevents malicious nodes
to perform directed attacks.
For example, consider an attacker who wants to move
a particular node to a different coordinate, e.g., to
inﬂuence the routing. If links were symmetric, he only
needs to put his own nodes physically into a position,
where the triangle inequality is violated towards
the attacked node, and let his nodes connect. The
attacked node would now consider its own position
to be wrong, and move in the controlled direction. In
order to prevent such an attack, nodes must either be
free to chose their neighborhood free of symmetry
constraints, or the legitimacy of neighborhood relation
must be proven by the upper layer overlay algorithm.
As this would tremendously reduce the applicable
deployment scenarios for Vivaldi, asymmetric links
will be assumed for the rest of the article.
5.3. Aggregation of measurement steps
While using Vivaldi as described in section 2 conver-
gency problems arise if nodes violate the triangle in-
equality as shown in Fig. 3. In this example network
node b is asymmetrically connected to the nodes a and
c while these however will not take an active part in the
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a b c
Fig. 3. Three nodes that violate the triangle inequality.
system. After requesting the coordinates from a and c,
b will move towards the ﬁrst node that answers, thus
decreasing the estimation error with this node while in-
creasing the error with the other. When the second re-
ply arrives, b will move towards the other node in the
same way. Even if all nodes are initially optimally em-
bedded, node b will still oscillate around its optimal
position without ever reaching it again. If there were
directed circles in the neighborhood graph, the network
might even move through the coordinate space.
To solve this problem, the algorithm has to compute
the change in the coordinates for each arriving reply
and aggregate them instead of applying them directly.
This way oscillations can be reduced and the example
above will converge immediately, thus aggregated up-
dates will be assumed in the following.
5.4. The simple crawler anomaly
However, due to the allowance of asymmetric links, Vi-
valdi does not exactly behave like a spring-mass-model
anymore and certain anomalies occur. Consider the
very simple network shown in Fig. 4, consisting of
three honest nodes that violate the triangle inequality.
In the constructed situation the nodes a and b as well
as b and c are too far apart while a and c are too close
together. Despite the network’s simple structure its co-
ordinates will never converge, but move with a constant
speed in one direction. Due to the inducted movement
pattern, we named this effect a crawler anomaly.
δe δe δe
rttab= rttbc
rttca> rttab+rttbc
e= eab= ebc= eca
Fig. 4. Crawler anomaly: three honest nodes with
asymmetric neighbor relations. The arrows are drawn
from the initiator to the neighbor.
We assume that any pair of nodes i, j is initially op-
timally embedded into an multidimensional Euclidean
space, with respect to the sum of the squared errors
eij = | ||i− j|| − rttij |. In this case the optimal coor-
dinates are located in one line as shown in Fig. 4 with
eab = ebc = eac. To simplify the upcoming calcula-
tions, δˆ is deﬁned to be the lower bound of the dynamic
damping factor δ. Since δ depends on the measured
coordinate errors, which cannot converge to zero due
to the triangle inequality violation, such a lower bound
exist and is greater zero. Since nodes’ coordinates are
already arranged in a line, the coordinates can further-
more be considered to be one-dimensional.
Because a only uses b’s coordinates to update its
own, it will move a at least δˆeab = δˆe units towards
b. The same goes for node b when communicating
with c. Since c and a are too close together, c will
move at least δˆe away from a after obtaining its
coordinates. Thus, all three nodes moved at least δˆe
into the same direction without any changes to their
distance, when assuming that all nodes update their
coordinates simultaneously. Since δˆ as well as e are
strictly greater than zero, the whole network will never
stop its movement.
While this anomaly works as described above with the
use of an Euclidean coordinate space, it will however
behave differently if applied to Vivaldi’s brush space.
Here, nodes a and b (forming the tail) are also pulled.
In difference to the Euclidean version, every step de-
creases the height component of the coordinates, thus
the tail is attracted to the ground of the brush. Node c
(the head) measures a delay against a that is too large
and is pushed away from the tail. Additionally, the
head’s height component is constantly growing until it
is equal to the delay to rttac − rttab. After that, b’s
position is right underneath c, since this place is the
closest to c, a is located rttab away from b, and the net-
work converges. Hence, modiﬁcations are necessary to
achieve the same movement within a brush space.
5.5. The pegged crawler anomaly
In order to create a movement, a fourth node (the peg)
is introduced, which maintains a symmetric neighbor
relation to the crawler’s head, as shown in Fig. 5. Be-
cause the delay between head and peg is much smaller
than between the other nodes, the head’s height is
bound to a low position. Again, nodes are arranged in
a line so that it sufﬁces to consider a one dimensional
afﬁne subspace and an additional height. As in the
previous section, δˆ is assumed to be constant and
considered to be a lower bound for the real dynamic δ.
We further assume, that nodes update their coordinates
cyclically using the aggregated Vivaldi-algorithm as
presented in section 5.3, and in the following order:
a → b, b → c, p → c, c → a, p.
a b
c
p
Fig. 5. Pegged crawler anomaly: simple crawler
anomaly augmented with a fourth node p that has a
symmetric neighbor relation to c
Lemma. Let B = {(a, ah), (b, bh), (c, ch), (p, ph) |
a, b, c ∈ R, ah, bh, ch ∈ R+} be the state space of pre-
viously described network. Then there is a Vivaldi state
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s = {(a, ah), (b, bh), (c, ch), (p, ph)} ∈ B, so that the
next-iteration state s′ = {(a′, a′h), (b′, b′h), (c′, c′h),
(p′, p′h)} ∈ B equals:
s′ = {(a+Δ, ah), (b+Δ, bh), (c+Δ, ch), (p+Δ, ph)}
with Δ > 0.
Proof. Let dij = |i− j| be the distance of node i and j
in the Euclidean dimension (heights not included). We
now deﬁne v, e, dab, dbc, dac, and dpc as the following:
v = rttac − (rttab + rttbc)
e = 1
5+2δˆ
v
dij = e+ rttij , for (i, j) ∈ {(a, b), (b, c), (p, c)}
dac = dab + dbc.
Furthermore, we set ah = bh = ph = 0 and ch = ,
with  close to zero. For the nodes a, b, p, c we get the
following update equations:
a′ = a+ δˆ(dab − rttab)
b′ = b+ δˆ(dbc + − rttbc)
p′ = a+ δˆ(dpc + − rttpc)
c′ = c+ δˆ2 (rttac − da′c − + rttpc − dp′c − ).
After the insertion of the deﬁned values we get:
a′ = a+ δˆe
b′ = b+ δˆe+ δˆ
p′ = p+ δˆe+ δˆ
and
c′ = c+ δˆ2 (rttac − da′c + rttpc − dp′c)− δˆ
= c+ δˆ2 (rttac − dac + rttpc − dpc − 2δˆe− δˆ)− δˆ
= c+ δˆ2 (rttac − dac − e− 2δˆe− δˆ)− δˆ
= c+ δˆ2 (rttac − dab − dbc − e− 2δˆe− δˆ)− δˆ
= c+ δˆ2 (v − (3 + 2δˆ)e− δˆ)− δˆ
= c+ δˆ2 ((5 + 2δˆ)e− (3 + 2δˆ)e− δˆ)− δˆ
= c+ δˆe− δˆ22 − δˆ.
We will leave out the calculation for c′h at this point,
but it can be seen that c′h < ch = , so the height of the
head also tends to zero. If we set  = 0 and assume,
that the nodes a, b and c violate the triangle inequality,
the lemma’s proposition is true with Δ = δˆe > 0.
In order experimentally validate that the described at-
tack can be successfully launched on the full Vivaldi
algorithm, simulations utilizing OMNeT++ have been
performed. Within the simulation the four nodes have
been arranged like in Fig. 5. In contrast to the proof,
all coordinates have been randomly initialized. Still, as
shown in Fig. 6, the center of the network is exposed
to a constant movement in all 64 runs. It also indicates
that neither a ﬁxed nor a speciﬁc communication order
is necessary for the anomaly to work.
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Fig. 6. Average movement of the crawler-network after
random initialization and 95% conﬁdence intervals of
64 runs
6. CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
The need for quickly adopting overlay networks
and the related development of network coordinate
systems, such as Vivaldi, have gained much inﬂuence
recently. Despite the emergence of security measures
for these distributed algorithms, no work has been done
to show the limits of such work. This article tries to
close the gap by identifying several issues and deﬁning
novel countermeasures. However, as we were able
to show, Vivaldi has an built-in weakness concerning
violated triangle inequalities. These allow attackers for
a generation of valid network conﬁgurations that result
in a movement of the overall overlay.
The focus of our future research is on the identiﬁca-
tion of further network motifs that create instabilities in
Vivaldi. Using this knowledge, we will construct spe-
cially adapted overlay algorithms that are invulnerable
to the sketched attacks, by avoiding instable conﬁgura-
tions.
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